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Commentary
Patrick Minford
particularly that from the consumer price index
(CPI) to the personal consumption expenditures
(PCE) deflator, their estimates find no shift in the
Fed rule. Their experiments with a rule estimated
for the CPI in the 1990s shows that the rule should
have shifted up on the move to the PCE in the
2000s. The rule might have also shifted with the
natural rate of employment; however, when they
included this rate in the equation along with the
inflation definition, the rule did not shift in line
with either or both together. Had the equilibrium
rate of interest been known, there may have been
no puzzle. However, the authors argue that they
had no estimate of this to include as a test; but
surely index-linked government bond yields pro-
vide some idea of shifting real rate equilibria?
This puzzle is particularly odd when viewed
side by side with the explicit 0.5 percent shift in
target inflation that occurred when the United
Kingdom made an essentially similar change—
from the retail price index to CPI. The U.S. CPI,
too, systematically grows 0.5 percent or so faster
than the PCE. The absence of a noticeable shift
in the rule makes one wonder exactly what the
FOMC projections are—a topic I return to below.
The logic of the Taylor projections rule
absolutely requires that the rule shifts when the
inflation definition changes; this shift should
have been imposed on the equation, together
with some estimate of changing real interest rate
equilibria based on index-linked bond-yield
trends.
T
he Taylor rule is widely seen as a good
summary of what the Federal Reserve
does. Though the rule cannot easily be
fitted to actual data as subsequently
revised, at least for a full postwar sample, it can
be fitted to real-time data (i.e., data as seen at the
time), as shown by earlier work by Orphanides
(2003). But in practice the Fed’s Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC), if it is using a Taylor
rule, will look at its own forecasts or projections.
Orphanides and Wieland (2008) examine whether
a Taylor rule can be fitted to the FOMC’s own
projections since 1988. They find that it can with
appropriate parameters that satisfy the Taylor
principle—that is, that give a unique stable solu-
tion under rational expectations. Furthermore,
they find that the rule works better with these
projections and resolves various puzzles regard-
ing the data on outcomes.
This is without question an interesting find-
ing; the paper is clear, cogent, and persuasive.
Many will be totally persuaded by it; however, I
do have a few doubts. Let me begin with some
issues of specification and estimation and then
proceed with two wider issues.
SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION
The Specification of the Taylor
Projections Rule for Changes in
Targets and Definitions
As the authors note, there remains a puzzle:
In spite of the change in the inflation definitions,
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I am concerned with the authors’ estimation.
They use ordinary least squares, a single-equation
estimator, which is open to bias because of the
correlation of the error term (the FOMC’s mone-
tary judgment, or interest rate “shock”) with both
endogenous variables. These are defined as lagged
variables; but truly they are the FOMC’s current
view of the forecast environment at the time
interest rates are set and use contemporaneous
data and reports on both output and inflation.
Given signal extraction and the semiannual fre-
quency of the data, it is clear that current data will
influence projections and so the current interest
rate judgment; at the same time, the interest rate
shock will affect output and inflation in the semi-
annual time frame. Furthermore, the error is auto-
correlated, except in the projections version when
a lagged interest rate is included for “adjustment”
reasons. However, in principle, even if the FOMC
revises its judgment each semiannual period, each
new judgment is unlikely to be independent of
the last one; given that it represents views on such
things as asset price movements, exchange rate
behavior, and special factors like the 9/11 attacks.
The FOMC’s judgment should show some per-
sistence, and indeed that is what most dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) modelers
assume about a monetary shock.
Given these issues, I regard the estimation
methods of this paper as rather casual. For a start,
we need more information on the error process;
does “adjustment” really eliminate autoregressive-
ness in the error? Second, we need some effort to
estimate the equation in a bias-free manner; full-
information methods are ruled out by the absence
of the rest of the model, but on this front it would
be helpful to see some instrumental variable or
two-stage least-squares results.
Third, however, there are difficulties with
any single-equation estimator, as pointed out by
Cochrane (2007a). To illustrate his point, consider
a standard New Keynesian model with a strict
inflation-targeting rule, Rt = ˈπt + it (it, the shock,
will in general be autocorrelated and also corre-
lated with πt). If we solve the model by imposing
a stable solution, inflation is an autoregression,
say, πt = ρπt–1 + ut (where the error is also auto-
correlated, say, with a root ʺ), and it follows that
the Fisher identity gives interest rates as Rt = rt +
Etπt+1, which thus equals ρπt + [ʺut + rt], where
the term in square brackets is an autocorrelated
error, correlated with πt. How can this regression
be distinguished from the inflation-targeting
regression? A systems estimator imposing all
over-identifying restrictions on the model is the
only way.
Modeling the FOMC Projections Rule
To use this FOMC projections rule in a model
requires some transfer function relating the Fed’s
projections to the actual state of the economy.
Thus, if the version here is to be taken seriously
as a representation of policy, we need to know
its properties in a full model, but of course those
properties depend on how the FOMC projections
are related to the actual economy.
It matters a lot whether they are, for example,
biased and/or subject to learning or rational
expectations. A key reason for knowing these
details is that they would make it possible to esti-
mate the rule appropriately by full-information
methods, as already argued.
SOME WIDER ISSUES
There are some wider issues I see as interest-
ingly raised by this paper. The first is what exactly
the Taylor rule is and how it fits into economic
thought on policy rules. The second is whether
this paper and associated work clinches the debate
on which monetary rule was actually being pur-
sued by the FOMC; I will argue that this turns on
a difficult issue of identification.
What Exactly Is the Taylor Rule?
Origins and Application
John Taylor wrote his paper (Taylor, 1993)
proposing the rule in the early 1990s. It seems
to have been heavily influenced by a 1989/90
Brookings conference event, which discussed
the performance of different monetary rules
(money supply, exchange rate targeting, or peg-
ging, mainly) within large models of the world
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World Model” (another was my “Liverpool World
Model”). As a new departure, Dale Henderson
and Warwick McKibbin asked the modelers—
around a dozen teams—to evaluate a new sugges-
tion that money be bypassed by setting interest
rates directly in response to macro data. Various
formulations were tried.
The modeling teams drew a blank initially in
solving their models under these rules; it seems
that they were tripping over indeterminacy and
had not discovered the Taylor principle, but it
may also have been that the algorithms being
used at that time (mostly variants of the Fair and
Taylor, 1993, method) simply had difficulty hom-
ing in on the solution.
These proposed rules, we may well now have
forgotten, were a quite unfamiliar way of thinking
about monetary policy. It is true that rules for
setting interest rates had had a long history (as
pointed out by Stanley Black at this Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis conference); indeed such
rules were dominant in the postwar Keynesian
era up to the 1970s. However, there was a strong
reaction against such ideas in the late 1970s and
1980s as the rational expectations revolution took
effect; interest rate rules were felt to give a poor
nominal anchor (and would give rise to indeter-
minacy unless tied to a nominal target) and instead
the setting of the money supply was emphasized.
This accounts for the fact that the primary rules
investigated in the Brookings conference were
either money supply rules or exchange rate rules.
When the teams had succeeded in solving
their models for these new rules, they were found
to perform surprisingly well and the results were
written up by Henderson and McKibbin (1993a,b)
at great length (1993a is in Bryant, Hooper, and
Mann, 1993, Chap. 2; 1993b was a version of this
chapter given at the same Carnegie-Rochester
conference where Taylor presented his own paper,
Taylor, 1993). It seems that the success of these
rules in a wide variety of models indicated a sur-
prising robustness, and it was this robustness that
Taylor later emphasized as a major attraction of
his own rule. He elaborated on this in further tests
on other models. After the Brookings conference,
in any case, John Taylor formulated his rule,
which could reasonably be termed the Henderson-
McKibbin-Taylor rule.
Nevertheless, there seems to be a difference
between these authors’ views. Whereas Henderson
and McKibbin were solely discussing what would
be a good rule and never, as far as I am aware,
argued that it was actually pursued, John Taylor
went further and argued not only that it worked
well but also that monetary policy could be
thought of as being done this way. A paraphrase
of his distinctive message could be “Look, here
is a rough approximation of what a good central
bank actually does and has done in the United
States in recent years.”
Thus, the attraction of the Taylor rule was
that it was descriptive as well as normative; this
was the new ingredient that Taylor added.1
Orphanides has in his earlier (2003) work argued
that it can indeed describe FOMC behavior for the
whole postwar period if real-time data are used.
Yet, as I shall argue below, it is this implicit claim
that the rule is descriptive that is problematic.
We can pursue this history further with a
review of how New Keynesian authors use the
Taylor rule to account for inflation in the post-
war period. Here, I follow the points made by
Cochrane (2007b).Henotesthattheseauthors(e.g.,
Clarida, Galí, and Gertler, 2000) have argued that
up to around 1980 the Taylor rule being pursued
by the Fed violated the Taylor principle and thus
produced or permitted high inflation; after 1980,
the Fed raised the coefficient on inflation above
unity and inflation was brought down. Yet, if the
Fed before 1980 had such a Taylor rule, then infla-
tion would have been indeterminate. So, in what
sense does this account for any inflation path at
all?2 (This is resolved by Orphanides, who says
that, throughout, the Fed had a good rule but just
Minford
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1 Yet, there is ambivalence even here. For example, McCallum
stated in answer to my question at the Carnegie-Rochester 2002
conference on the Taylor rule that the rule was essentially norma-
tive, not descriptive. Ireland (2003), at the same conference, how-
ever, took the view that it was both a normative rule (enabling
monetary economists to coalesce around inflation targeting after
years of wrangling about other rules) and positive, in that central
banks actually thought of policy in terms of Taylor rules.
2 The Taylor principle and this stable-sunspot corrollary can be
illustrated for a simple model in which real interest rates are an
exogenous AR(1) process (more complex models can producehad bad estimates of the output gap in the 1970s;
to account for inflation, then, a full model includ-
ing private sector information and learning is
needed, which then makes this a branch of the
learning literature and not a rational expectations
model like the New Keynesian one.) For the post-
1980 period, Cochrane (2007b) argues that the
way the rule works to discipline inflation is in
any case incredible: In effect, the Fed threatens
to raise inflation and interest rates without limit
should inflation deviate from the stable path.
Because people believe this threat, inflation goes
to this unique path. Yet, what stops them from
choosing one of these deviant paths, so that the
Fed has to go along with them? Deviant paths in
models with money supply targets can be sup-
pressed by Fed action on the money supply; here
it is not clear what the Fed will do to rule out
deviant paths.
Thus, there is a doctrinal puzzle in the Taylor
rule approach. The Taylor rule emerged from a
money-supply-rule world because models were
found to behave rather well when the rule was
imposed together with some unspecified device
to rule out unstable paths. However, it was for-
gotten that in previous models that device had
involved action on the money supply. I think
what this shows is that the Taylor rule is an essen-
tially incomplete statement about monetary pol-
icy. One has to assume that the authorities have
some additional tool in their locker to rule out
unstable paths. Cochrane (2007b) argues this can
be a non-Ricardian fiscal policy. It could also be
a money supply policy of the central bank.
Does This Work Compel Us To Believe
the Fed Really Was Pursuing a Taylor
Rule?
Identification Across Possible Models. The
problem with the claim that the Fed projections
rule is descriptive is in a general sense one of
identification across possible models. DSGE
models give rise to the same correlations between
interest rates and inflation, even if the Fed is
doing something quite different, such as target-
ing the money supply. For example, Minford,
Perugini, and Srinivasan (2002 and 2003) show
this in a DSGE model with Fischer wage con-
tracts. Gillman, Le, and Minford (2007) use a
real business cycle growth model with cash and
credit in advance to derive a steady-state, or
cointegrating, relation between interest rates
and inflation and the growth rate when money
supply growth is fixed—a “speed limit” version
of the rule. The route they use to obtain an appar-
ent Taylor rule is the Fisher equation, which links
nominal interest rates with expected future
inflation and real interest rates; they then use
the relation elsewhere in the model, equating
growth with the real interest rates to obtain a
“Taylor rule.”
This identification would still be a problem
under the projections rule because of how the
transfer function relates the actual data to the
projections; that is, any relationship between
interest rates and FOMC projections could be
translated by this function into one between inter-
est rates and actual data. I will return below to
what this transfer function might look like. For
now, let us just compare the normal Taylor rule
using actual data with the other rule’s implied
Taylor-type equation.
To illustrate the point in detail, consider a
popular DSGE model but with a money supply






This model implies a Taylor-type relationship
that looks like
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slightly different Taylor conditions): rt = ρrt–1 + ʵt. Now add a
Taylor rule for inflation only, Rt = ʱπt, and the Fisher identity,
Rt = rt + Etπt+1. The general solution of the model is πt = krt + ʾt,
where k = ￿1/ʱ – ρ￿ and the sunspot ʾt = ʱʾt–1 + ʷt with ʷt chosen
randomly (the solution can be verified by substituting it into
rt = –Etπt+1 + ʱπt). If ʱ ≥ 1, then the sunspot is ruled out by the con-
dition that the solution must be stable. But if ʱ < 1, then inflation
is a stable process with a sunspot and hence indeterminate in that
each period the path can jump anywhere.where ˇ = ˈ2ʳ – ˈ1ˆ and the error term, wt, is
both correlated with inflation and output and
autocorrelated; it contains the current money
supply/demand and aggregate demand shocks
and also various lagged values (the change in
lagged expected future inflation, interest rates,
the output gap, the money demand shock, and
the aggregate demand shock). This particular
Taylor-type relation was created with a combina-
tion of equations—the solution of the money
demand and supply curves for interest rates, the
Fisher identity, and the IS curve for expected
future output.3 But other Taylor-type relationships
could be created with combinations of other equa-
tions, including the solution equations, generated
by the model. They will all exhibit autocorrelation
and contemporaneous correlation with output
and inflation, clearly of different sorts depending
on the combinations used.
Identification is of course a quite separate
matter from estimation; the usual assumption is
that we have infinite amounts of data to carry out
completely accurate estimation. In fact, OLS esti-
mation would be inappropriate, as we have seen,
because it forces the error term to be orthogonal
Rr yy w t tt t =++ − () +− () +
∗ ∗− ∗ − ∗ πʳ ˇ ππ ψ ˇ
1
1
1 , to the regressors, yet because this cannot be the
case, it induces bias. Instead, estimation is done
by a full-information estimator, which allows for
the model’s simultaneity, including of the error
term in this equation. With infinite data, we
retrieve the parameters exactly and also the error
terms. The error term in the Taylor rule proper is,
as we have seen, the “monetary shock” created by
FOMC special judgments on current events. This
is, therefore, like the errors in the Taylor-type
relationships, correlated with current events,
including the output gap and inflation, both
because these influence FOMC judgments (even
if they do not observe the correct values, they
know enough to extract signals from current
reports, snapshot statistics, etc.) and because these
shocks may affect current output and inflation.
Distinguishing between the two equations is
likely to be difficult in general. The error terms
of both the Taylor rule and Taylor-type relations
are autocorrelated and correlated with output
and inflation. The coefficients on output and
inflation in both are positive and that on inflation
in the Taylor rule will be higher than the one in
the Taylor-type relation if ˈ2ʳ – ˈ1ˆ is less than ʳ.
The constant in both is the steady-state value of
inflation plus the real rate of interest.
Identification by “Narrative Evidence” and
by Projections? Could we nevertheless be confi-
dent that there is a Taylor rule because of what
we definitely know about policymakers’ behavior
(what we might call narrative evidence)? In his
replies to my comments, Athanasios Orphanides
stated that FOMC minutes during this sample
period (from 1988) supported the interpretation
that the projections determined interest rate set-
ting. However, the problem is that we cannot
see directly in this way what FOMC policymakers
were doing. They vote and there are minutes, but
we do not know what they are really trying to
do. We are familiar from psychology that people
may describe their actions in one way when in
truth they are being compelled to act (in a
“deterministic” way) by other forces; also there
may be reasons of prudence or politics that lead
people to disguise the motives for their actions.
Even when there is a legal objective, as in the
United Kingdom, policymakers pursue all sorts
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3 From the money demand and money supply equation,
Substitute Et–1yt+1 from the IS curve and then inside that for real
interest rates from the Fisher identity, giving
then, rearrange this as
where the constants R* and y* have been subtracted from Rt and
yt, respectively, exploiting the fact that when differenced they
disappear. Finally, obtain
where we have used the steady-state property that R* = r* + π*
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recently we have had different members of the
Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee
being particularly concerned with measures like
house prices, other asset prices, the state of the
labor market, and latterly “moral hazard.” All
these have jostled in the voting for a place in
interest rate setting.
Furthermore, there have been many phases
in U.S. policy, as in U.K. policy. Under Bretton
Woods, the dollar’s fixed rate against the Deutsche
mark put some brakes on U.S. policy. After the
end of Bretton Woods, leading to the Louvre and
Plaza accords there were still flurries of concern
with exchange rates; intermittently right up to
present times there has been policy concern
with the current account deficit and the need for
exchange-rate movement. In 1979-81 there was a
big debate about money supply targets and an
episode of reserve targeting. Congress mandated
that the Fed give an account of its efforts to hit
various money supply targets in the 1970s and
1980s. Electoral pressures seem to have played a
part at times. Further, we know that for much of
the earlier postwar period some policymakers
believed that inflation could be contained by
wage/price controls and interest rates could be
used to bring down unemployment. Even in
recent times, influential policymakers have been
opposed to an inflation target—including some
policymakers inside the Fed itself—on the
grounds that there needs to be “flexibility” to
deal with unemployment.
Finally, I note that the Fed, more or less now
alone among central banks within the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development,
does not have a formal inflation target set by law.
This certainly makes it harder, even in this recent
sample period from 1988, to use narrative evi-
dence to identify the FOMC’s rule.
Can We Be Confident Because We See Such
a Close Correlation Between Projections and
Interest Rates? It may be argued that such a high
correlation (an R
2 of over 90 percent) proves
beyond doubt that Fed governors were using
their projections to produce their view on interest
rates. This too is problematic; indeed such a high
R
2 arouses suspicion.4 We do not know how
these projections are produced, only that each
governor sends them to the meeting having pro-
duced them with the help of his or her staff.
They are then cropped and averaged to give the
published values for the Humphrey-Hawkins
legislation’s requirements. A reasonable suspicion
would be that the fit is so close because the
governors want to present a plausible public
case for their views on interest rates; hence,
governors that wish to raise rates will generate
forecasts of higher inflation and/or higher out-
put gap (overheating). Their reasons for raising
rates may be quite different from these. Thus,
their projections are molded by their views, not
as assumed here, the other way round, views by
projections.
On this skeptical view of such a close fit, we
have no evidence of what was driving the gover-
nors’ views. It could be that they are closet mone-
tarists. It could be that they worry about asset
prices or their latest regional data—any number
of things. In the end, it still comes out looking
like they follow a Taylor projections rule.
This way of thinking about FOMC decisions
could account for the lack of shift in the inflation
forecasts after the change from CPI to PCE: If the
governors are just rationalizing their interest rate
decisions by producing projections, they will
choose numbers not in the spirit of a good fore-
cast but more in order to signal clearly the need
they perceive to raise or lower rates. The actual
number would be of little significance; the direc-
tion would be solely what mattered.
Consider now what the transfer function
might look like. It translates the governors’ aver-
age inflation and unemployment projections into
the state variables producing them. Hence, these
variables would be a mixture that could include
domestic asset prices, the exchange rate, the
money supply, unemployment and its disper-
sion—any variables that governors believe would
trigger their desired interest rate change.
4 I owe this point to Clemens Kool. In his conference comment,
Steven Cecchetti (2008) also questioned the meaning of these
forecasts.
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This interesting paper shows that, if one
thinks the Taylor rule definitely describes the
FOMC’s behavior over the past two decades, then
a rather convincing relationship can be found,
though there are concerns about estimation, how
the transfer function relates projections to the
actual data, and the puzzling lack of shift in the
projections in response to well-known shifts in
the environment. Yet the Taylor rule, as its intel-
lectual history suggests, is an incomplete descrip-
tion of monetary policy, at least within a New
Keynesian model; it cannot account for determi-
nate inflation before 1980, and after 1980 it lacks
a clear mechanism for ruling out unstable paths.
If one is not a priori convinced it describes
the FOMC’s behavior in the past two decades,
then there is a nontrivial issue of identification:
Taylor-type relationships can emerge from a
DSGE model where no Taylor rule is guiding
monetary policy. To test the Taylor rule descrip-
tive hypothesis convincingly, one really needs to
compare results for a full model with alternative
formulations of monetary policy. That way we
can see whether the data rejects one or other pol-
icy formulation when embedded in a full-model
structure.
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